Expected utility theory (EU) is unable to accommodate the observed non-linear weighting of probabilities. We outline three stylized facts on non-linear weighting that a theory of risk must ideally address. These are that people: overweight small probabilities and underweight large ones (S1); do not choose stochastically dominated options when such dominance is obvious (S2); ignore very small probabilities and code extremely large probabilities as one (S3). We then show that the concept of a probability weighting function (PWF) is crucial in addressing S1-S3. A PWF is not, however, in itself, a theory of risk. PWF's need to be embedded within some theory of risk in order to have signi…cant predictive content. The two main alternative theories that are relevant in this regard are rank dependent utility (RDU) and cumulative prospect theory (CP). RDU and CP explain S1, S2 but not S3.
Under expected utility theory (EU) decision makers weight probabilities linearly. But the evidence suggests non-linear weighting of probabilities. Consider the following example from [15] , p.283. Suppose that one is compelled to play Russian roulette. One would be willing to pay much more to reduce the number of bullets from one to zero than from four to three. However, in each case, the reduction in the probability of a bullet …ring is 1/6 and, so, under EU, the decision maker should be willing to pay the same amount. This suggests non-linear weighting of probabilities, which is also supported by emerging neuro-economic evidence; see, [4] .
Let X = fx 1 ; x 2 ; :::; x n g be a …xed, …nite, set of real numbers, which represents the possible monetary outcomes/wealth levels. Assume that x 1 < x 2 < ::: < x n . The decision maker has a set of feasible actions, A. Any action in A induces a probability distribution (p 1 ; p 2 ; :::; p n ), p i 0 and P n i=1 p i = 1, over the outcomes. We then write a lottery, L, as L = (x 1 ; p 1 ; x 2 ; p 2 ; :::; x n ; p n ) , (0.1)
with the interpretation that outcome x i occurs with probability p i . Let L be the set of such lotteries. How should the decision maker choose an action in A? EU postulates the existence of an expected utility functional, EU : L ! R, which under well known assumptions (see e.g., [10] ) takes the form
where u (x i ) is the utility of the outcome x i . EU predicts that the decision maker will choose that action/lottery which leads to the highest real number according to (0.2). A key axiom used in the derivation of (0.2) is the independence axiom.
De…nition 1 (Independence axiom): Suppose that is a preference relation de…ned over the set of lotteries. Then for all lotteries L 1 , L 2 , L, and all p 2 (0; 1], L 1 L 2 , (L 1 ; p; L; 1 p) (L 2 ; p; L; 1 p) :
The independence axiom is routinely violated. Alternatives to EU mainly relax this axiom. Two main features of EU stand out. (1) There is additive separability across outcomes. (2) The objective function is linear in probabilities. Most alternatives to EU relax the second feature, i.e., linearity in probabilities. Suppose that the decision maker weights outcome x i with a non-linear decision weighting function (p) : [0; 1] ! [0; 1]. Then a prototype non-linear weighting model may instead value a lottery L 2 L as:
However, it is well known (see, e.g., [29] ) that by simply transforming objective probabilities as in (0.3), the decision maker may choose stochastically dominated options (violation of monotonicity) even when such dominance is obvious.
Based on the brief discussion so far, we summarize our …rst two stylized facts, S1, S2. S1 Decision makers weight probabilities in a non-linear manner. The evidence suggests that decision makers overweight low probabilities and underweight high probabilities (inverse S-shaped probability weighting). .
S2. Incorporation of non-linear probabilities into a prototype non-expected utility model can violate monotonicity.
We now highlight another stylized fact of great signi…cance that has received relatively less attention.
S3. For events close to the boundary of the probability interval [0; 1], extensive evidence suggests that decision makers, (i) ignore events of extremely low probability, and (ii) treat extremely high probability events as certain. S1 and S2 are well documented; see [14] , [29] . However, S3 is less well documented. We now brie ‡y review the evidence behind S3. [15] in their work on prospect theory (PT) were acutely aware of S3. In PT, there is a psychologically-rich editing phase followed by an evaluation/decision phase; the latter uses a rule of the form (0.3). From our perspective, in the most critical aspect of the editing phase, decision makers decide which extreme probability events to ignore. This is re ‡ected in the manner that (p) is drawn by [15] ; see [15] wrote the following (on p. 282-83) to cogently summarize the evidence on the end-points of the probability interval [0; 1]. "The sharp drops or apparent discontinuities of (p) at the end-points are consistent with the notion that there is a limit to how small a decision weight can be attached to an event, if it is given any weight at all. A similar quantum of doubt could impose an upper limit on any decision weight that is less than unity... On the other hand, the simpli…cation of prospects can lead the individual to discard events of extremely low probability and to treat events of extremely high probability as if they were certain. Because people are limited in their ability to comprehend and evaluate extreme probabilities, highly unlikely events are either ignored or overweighted, and the di¤erence between high probability and certainty is either neglected or exaggerated. Consequently (p) is not well-behaved near the end-points."
[1], [2] and [9] review evidence supportive of the claim of [15] , from many disparate contexts. These include the low-take up of insurance for very low probability events; the ine¤ectiveness of low probability-high magnitude punishments; low incidence of seat belt usage and low take-up of breast cancer examination when non-mandatory; running red tra¢ c lights and driving and talking on mobile phones which involve a low probability accident with high costs, etc. This evidence strongly underpins S3. [1] , [2] and [9] draw two main conclusion from the evidence.
1. Human behavior for low probability events cannot easily be explained by the existing mainstream theoretical models of risk. EU and the associated auxiliary assumptions are unable to explain the stylized facts. Furthermore, the leading non-expected utility alternatives such as rank dependent utility (RDU), prospect theory (PT), and cumulative prospect theory (CP) make the problem even worse.
2.
A natural explanation for these phenomena seems to be that individuals simply ignore or seriously underweight very low probability events (stylized fact S3).
There is some evidence of a bimodal perception of risks that could o¤er a potential explanation; see [6] and for the evidence, see [28] . Some individuals focus more on the probability and others on the size of the loss. The former do not pay attention to losses that fall below a certain probability threshold, while for the latter, the size of the loss is relatively more salient. Hence, S3 applies to the former set of individuals, which given the evidence, seem to predominate.
A look ahead and the notion of a probability weighting function (PWF)
Stylized facts S1, S2, S3 would seem to be the minimum requirements that a theory of risk should address. Most alternatives to EU that use non-linear weighting of probabilities, such as RDU, PT, CP invoke the concept of a probability weighting function (PWF) to incorporate stylized facts S1 and S2. None of these theories can incorporate all three stylized facts S1,S2,S3. We examine below emerging work due to [1] , [2] , [9] who propose composite cumulative prospect theory (CCP) that successfully addresses all three S1, S2, S3.
Remark 1 A PWF, by itself, is not a theory of risk. It needs to be embedded within other theories, such as RDU, PT, CP for it to have signi…cant predictive content in concrete economic situations. A simple proof, that we omit, can be used to demonstrate the following properties of a PWF; see [1] . Remark 2 (Standard probability weighting functions): A large number of probability weighting functions have been proposed, e.g., those by [12] , [18] , [22] , [32] . They all in…nitely overweight in…nitesimal probabilities and in…nitely underweight near-one probabilities. We shall call these the standard probability weighting functions. All these functions violate stylized fact S3.
Addressing stylized fact S1
The Prelec function [22] , which is also a standard probability weighting function in the sense of remark 2 is the most satisfactory function that addresses S1. It is parsimonious, consistent with the evidence on S1 and has an axiomatic foundation. 
The following Proposition can be easily checked. The parameter controls the convexity/concavity of the Prelec function. Between the region of strict convexity (w 00 > 0) and the region of strict concavity (w 00 < 0), there is a point of in ‡exion (w 00 = 0). The parameter in the Prelec function controls the location of the in ‡exion point relative to the 45 0 line. Sometimes, the respective roles of and are also referred to as the curvature and elevation properties of a probability weighting function; see [12] and [17] . Not all PWF's allow for a clear separation between curvature and elevation. This is particularly the case for PWF's that involve one parameter rather than two parameters. Some single parameter PWF's are: [16] , [26] , [7] , [32] , [20] , [13] , [27] . Among the two parameter PWF's are those by [11] , [18] , [22] .
The full set of possibilities for the [22] function, for di¤erent combinations of ; is established in [1] . A simple proof leads to the following result. 1 p = 0.
According to [22] , p.505, the in…nite limits in Proposition 3a capture the qualitative change as we move from certainty to probability and from impossibility to improbability. On the other hand, they contradict stylized fact S3, i.e., the observed behavior that people ignore events of very low probability and treat very high probability events as certain. These speci…c problems are avoided for > 1. However, for > 1, the Prelec function is S-shaped. This, however is in con ‡ict with stylized fact S1.
Axiomatic derivations of Prelec' s PWF
The Prelec function appears to be the one with the strongest empirical support. To quote from [31] , p.102: "the most predictive version of [cumulative prospect theory] has a power value curve, a single parameter risky weighting function due to [22] and a Logit stochastic process." It was also the …rst axiomatically derived probability weighting function. Here, we overview three derivations of Prelec's function: [22] , based on compound invariance, and [19] , [3] , based on, respectively, reduction invariance and power invariance.
We assume here that 0 2 X, the set of outcomes, and we shall restrict ourselves to the special class of lotteries de…ned as follows.
De…nition 8 : Let S
L be the subset of all lotteries of the forms (x), (x; p 1 ), ((x; p 1 ) ; p 2 ) and (((x; p 1 ) ; p 2 ) ; p 3 ), where x 2 X and p 1 ; p 2 ; p 3 2 [0; 1].
To simplify notation, we shall refer to ((x; p 1 ) ; p 2 ) and (((x; p 1 ) ; p 2 ) ; p 3 ) by (x; p 1 ; p 2 ) and (x; p 1 ; p 2 ; p 3 ), respectively. Thus, (x) is the lottery whose outcome is x for sure, (x; p 1 ) is the lottery whose outcomes are x with probability p 1 and 0 with probability 1 p 1 , (x; p 1 ; p 2 ) is the lottery whose outcomes are (x; p 1 ) with probability p 2 and 0 with probability 1 p 2 and (x; p 1 ; p 2 ; p 3 ) is the lottery whose outcomes are (x; p 1 ; p 2 ) with probability p 3 and 0 with probability 1 p 3 .
Given a strictly increasing function, u : X ! R, and a probability weighting function, w, we can extend u to a function, U : S ! R, by the following de…nition. De…nition 10 : Let be the order on S induced by U , i.e., for all L 1 ; L 2 2 S, L 1 L 2 , U (L 1 ) U (L 2 ). De…nition 11 ([22] ): The preference relation, , satis…es compound invariance if, for all outcomes x, y, x 0 , y 0 2 X, probabilities p, q, r, s 2 [0; 1] and integers n 1, the following holds. If (x; p) (y; q) and (x; r) (y; s), then (x 0 ; p n ) (y 0 ; q n ) implies (x 0 ; r n ) (y 0 ; s n ). It is easy to check that for w (p) = p (i.e., the EU case) compound invariance, reduction invariance and power invariance are all satis…ed. Hence, each of these constitutes a weakening (or generalization) of EU. From Proposition 4, all three axioms, compound invariance, reduction invariance and power invariance are equivalent. For further developments, the reader could pursue [31] and [8] .
Addressing stylized fact S2
There are two main ways of addressing S2. Either one uses rank dependent expected utility theory (RDU) or cumulative prospect theory (CP). Quiggen's main insight in [23] , [24] was that it is not individual probabilities that should be transformed (which gave rise to the violation of monotonicity reported in S2) but, rather, cumulative probabilities. When EU is applied to the transformed cumulative probabilities we get what is now known as RDU.
In RDU, the decision maker uses (0.3) with the decision weights generated as follows.
De…nition 14 : Consider the lottery (x 1 ; p 1 ; x 2 ; p 2 ; :::; x n ; p n ), where x 1 < x 2 < ::: < x n . Let w be the probability weighting function. For RDU, the decision weights, i , are de…ned as follows. n = w (p n ), n 1 = w (p n 1 + p n ) w (p n ), ::: i = w n j=i p j w n j=i+1 p j , :::
From De…nition 14, we get that, j 0 and P n j=1 j = 1.
(3.1)
Proposition 5 ([23]): A decision maker who uses RDU, never chooses stochastically dominated options (i.e., does not violate monotonicity). In other words, for a RDU decision maker there is no problem with explaining S2.
A result analogous to that in Proposition 5 also holds for the case of cumulative prospect theory (CP); see [32] and [30] . In CP, the domain of outcomes is split into the domain of gains and the domain of losses by expressing each outcome relative to some reference point. We note here that the decision weights across the domain of gains and losses under CP do not necessarily add up to 1. This contrasts with the case of RDU, in which there is no conception of di¤erent domains of gains and losses, so the decision weights add up to one. Since CP uses the cumulative weighting machinery from RDU, the following Proposition holds.
Proposition 6 : A decision maker who uses CP does not chooses stochastically dominated options. Hence, CP can address stylized fact S2.
The PWF plays an important role in determining a rich set of attitudes towards risk under CP. Under EU, attitudes to risk are determined purely by the curvature of the utility function. Under CP, however, the utility function is concave in the domain of gains and convex in the domain of losses (see, [15] ). Hence, it might be tempting to conclude that under CP the decision maker is risk averse in the domain of gains and risk loving in the domain of losses. This is not true because of the role played by the interaction of the PWF and the curvature of the utility function under CP, in determining attitudes to risk. The following four-fold pattern of risk preferences can be show under CP; see [14] . The decision maker is risk loving for small probabilities in the domain of gains and non-small probabilities in the domain of losses. He/she is also risk averse for non-small probabilities in the domain of gains and small probabilities in the domain of losses.
Addressing stylized fact S3
While RDU and CP in conjunction with, say, the Prelec function, [22] , are able to explain S1 and S2, they are unable to address stylized fact S3. This has been an open problem for a while.
[1] make the ambitious proposal of combining the psychological-richness of PT with the more satisfactory cumulative transformation of probabilities in CP. They combine PT and CP into a single theory, that they call composite cumulative prospect theory (CCP), which essentially combines the editing and decision phases of PT into a single phase, while retaining cumulative transformations of probability, as in CP. CCP successfully accounts for all three stylized facts S1, S2 and S3. It can explain everything that RDU and CP can, but the reverse is false.
An immediate implication of Proposition 3(a) is that the Prelec weighting function can explain S1 but not S3. From Proposition 3(b), we know that for > 1, the Prelec function is S-shaped, which contradicts S1. In order to explain S1, S2, S3 using CCP, [1] introduce a modi…cation to the [22] function in a manner that is consistent with the empirical evidence. They eliminate the discontinuities at the end-points in Figure 0 In Figure 4 .1, decision makers heavily underweight very low probabilities in the range [0; p 1 ] (compare this to remark 2 for standard PWF's of which the Prelec function, [22] , is an example). Akin to the editing phase in [15] , decision makers who use the weighting function in Figure 4 .1 would typically ignore very low probability events by assigning low subjective weights to them. Hence, in conformity with the evidence (see [1] , [2] and [9] ) they are unlikely to be dissuaded from 'low-probability high-punishment'crimes, reluctant to buy insurance for very low probability events (unless mandatory), reluctant to wear seat belts (unless mandatory), reluctant to participate in voluntary breast screening programs (unless mandatory); willing to run red tra¢ c lights and so on. In the probability range [p 3 ; 1], events are overweighted as suggested by [15] , p.282-83. In the middle segment, p 2 [p 1 ; p 3 ], the PWF is identical to the Prelec function, and so successfully addresses S1.
For examples of the CPF, …tted to actual data, see [1] , [2] . Due to space limitations we restrict ourselves to a brief, formal, description of the CPF. This implements the general shape of the CPF in ; p = e 1 1 1
:
(4.1)
Essentially, the CPF in Figure 4 .1 is described by segments from three di¤erent Prelec probability weighting functions. The …rst is de…ned over the range 0 < p p, the second over the range p < p p, and the third is de…ned over the range p < p 1. where p and p are given by (4.1) and
By Proposition 7, the CPF in (4.2), (4.3) is a PWF in the sense of De…nition 2. By Proposition 8, a CPF overweights low probabilities, i.e., those in the range (p 1 ; p 2 ), and underweights high probabilities, i.e., those in the range (p 2 ; p 3 ). Thus, it accounts for stylized fact S1. But, in addition, and unlike all the standard probability weighting functions, it underweights probabilities near zero, i.e., those in the range (0; p 1 ), and overweights probabilities close to one, i.e., those in the range (p 3 ; 1) as required in S3. 1 p = 0 (De…nition 4b).
[1] show that their proposed probability weighting function in Figure 4 .1 is axiomatic, parsimonious and ‡exible. The axiomatic derivation uses the axiom of local power invariance, which is a variant of the axiom that [3] use in the proof of the Prelec PWF.
De…nition 16 ([1]
): Otherwise standard CP, when combined with a CPF is called composite cumulative prospect theory (CCP). Analogously, otherwise standard RDU, when combined with a CPF, is referred to as composite rank dependent utility (CRDU).
[1] prove the following proposition, whose intuition would by now be largely clear to the reader from our discussion of the CPF. Because probabilities in the middle ranges are weighted as in [22] , stylized fact S1 is explained. Because cumulative transformations of probability are undertaken in CCP and CRDU, S2 is explained. And because of the property of the CPF in Proposition 9, S3 is explained. Proposition 10 ([1]): CCP and CRDU can explain S1, S2 and S3.
[5] shows that the St. Petersberg paradox re-emerges under CP. [1] show that the St. Petersberg paradox can be resolved under CCP mainly through the role played by the CPF. [25] also propose a PWF that resolves the St. Petersberg paradox but it cannot explain stylized fact S3.
In comparison to CRDU, CCP, in addition, incorporates reference dependence, loss aversion and richer attitudes towards risk. Hence, it can explain everything that CRDU can, but the converse is false. Furthermore, because CCP explains S1, S2 and S3, while CP (and RDU) can only explain S1, S2, CCP can explain everything that CP (and RDU) can, but the converse is false. In light of these observations it is interesting to note the observation in [21] that "RDU is currently the most popular decision theory under risk."
